Varieties of Property Physicalism
I take it that Kim is concerned with the problem of property dualism, i.e., the problem of whether mental states and properties can be integrated into a scientific world view as presented to us by physical science. However, before it is possible to answer this question, one will have to clarify what could be meant by "integration" in this context. The traditional answer to this preliminary question was the following: Mental states and properties can be integrated into a scientific world view if (and only if) they are identical with, or reducible to, physical states or properties. This answer, however, generated serious difficulties when the two main brands of reductionism, Semantical Physicalism (Logical Behaviorism) and the Identity Theory, finally were regarded as definitely wrong. After this breakdown there seemed to be only two options left: Either one could surrender unconditionally and admit that property physicalism with regard to mental properties is simply wrong, or one could search for a loophole by trying to find a version of physicalism that is not reductive. The majority of naturalistically minded philosophers opted for the second alternative. Accordingly, the last years witnessed a large number of papers which applied themselves to the question of whether there is life in physicalism beyond Semantical Physicalism and Identity Theory -an endeavour that has become known as "The Search for Non-Reductive Physicalism".
For a long time the main contenders for the title of Non-Reductive Physicalism were the token identity theory associated with the idea of functionalism 3 and the supervenience theory developed by Jaegwon Kim. Whatever its other merits may be, the token identity theory, however, cannot provide a solution to the problem at hand, because it deliberately ignores the question of how mental properties, as property types, are related to physical properties. For a long time therefore, one had to seek refuge in the supervenience theory. The basic idea of this theory is the following:
The mental is dependent upon the physical insofar as there cannot be a mental difference without a physical difference.
Or, to put it more precisely:
(ST!) Mental properties supervene on physical properties insofar as there are not two objects (in this world or in all possible worlds) which differ with regard to their mental properties, but do not differ regarding their physical ones, i.e., indiscernibility in respect of physical properties entails indiscernibility in respect of mental properties.
However, what the supervenience theory amounts to will become even clearer when one turns to a third formulation which under certain conditions can be shown to be equivalent to (ST!).
(ST") For every mental property M it is true that: If an object x has M, there exists a physical property P such that: x has P and (necessarily) for all y: if y has P, then y has M.
As Kim himself points out, this formulation amounts to the thesis that every mental property has a physical basis. Hence, in my view, the core of the supervenience theory is something like this:
(PhB) Every mental state M has a physical basis. That is to say, for every mental state M there exists a set P = {P 1 , ..., P n , ...} of physical states for which it is true (in this world, or in all worlds accessible from this one):
(a) M only occurs if one of the states P i # P occurs; (b) for all states P i # P it is true: if P i occurs, then M also occurs.
Obviously the fulfilment of (PhB) is a necessary condition for any physicalist position; but is this condition alone sufficient for an adequate analysis of nonreductionistic physicalism? In recent years Kim himself has argued that there are a number of reasons for a negative answer to this question. 4 Firstly, a position can only be called physicalist if it entails that the mental is dependent upon the physical in an asymmetrical way; even if all mental states have a physical basis, however, this does not preclude that the reverse is also true. Secondly, it can be the case that the condition (PhB) is fulfilled because the mental as well as the physical are dependent upon something else in the way in which, according to physicalism, the mental should be dependent upon the physical. Finally, the fulfilment of (PhB) alone cannot provide the grounds for a physicalist position because it is easily compatible with clearly dualist positions such as parallelism or epiphenomenalism. However, the crucial theoretical weakness of the supervenience theory only becomes apparent if one confronts it with Broad's reflections on the concept of emergence.
Broad's considerations were developed as a contribution to the debate about the problem of Vitalism; a problem which at the turn of the century was as pressing for many scientists as the mind-body problem is today. Two factions opposed each other: the Mechanists, who claimed that the properties characteristic of living organisms (metabolism, perception, goal-directed behavior, procreation, morphogenesis) could be explained mechanically, i.e., could in the last consequence be explained physically, and the Vitalists, who held the contrary, namely that an explanation as envisaged by the mechanists was impossible and one had to postulate a special substance in order to explain life -an entelechy or an élan vital. In his theory of emergent properties Broad attempted to create room for a third position mediating between these two extremes.
Broad's first step was to point out that the problem of Vitalism is only a special case of a much more general problem -the problem of how the macroproperties of a complex system are related to its micro-structure, i.e., of how the macro-properties are related to the properties of the parts which make up the system and their arrangement. Regarding this relation there is the possibility (which amounts to a vitalistic position) that a macro-property F of a system cannot be explained by means of its micro-structure, but only by postulating an additional substance. However, if we disregard this possibility, we are not just left with one further possibility (mechanism), but -Broad argues -with two: the property F can be mechanically explainable, but it can also be emergent. The difference between these two positions Broad explains as follows:
Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes, composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other; that all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the same kind as R have certain characteristic properties; that A, B, and C are capable of occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not of the same kind as R; and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A, B, C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A, B, C). The mechanistic theory rejects the last clause of this assertion. (Broad 1925, 61) Hence, Broad's concepts of mechanical explainability and emergence can be summarized as follows:
(ME) A macro-property F of a complex system S with the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] (S consists of the parts C 1 , ..., C n in the arrangement R) is mechanically explainable if and only if the following is true:
(a) The statement "For all x: if x has the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] then x has the macro-property F" is a true law of nature, and (b) F can (at least in principle) be deduced from the complete knowledge of all properties which the components C 1 , ..., C n have either in isolation or within other arrangements.
(E) A macro-property F of a complex system S with the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] is emergent if and only if the following is true:
(a) The statement "For all x: if x has the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] then x has the macro-property F" is a true law of nature, but (b) F cannot (not even in principle) be deduced from the complete knowledge of all properties which the components C 1 , ..., C n have either in isolation or within other arrangements.
In Beckermann (1992b) I have investigated the reasons which motivated Broad's choice of the rather complicated formulation of condition (b); and I can only summarize the result of these considerations here. Broad wishes to preclude the use of certain ad hoc properties of the system components or ad hoc laws in the deduction of the property F and to ensure instead that only fundamental properties of S's components and the laws of nature generally applying to objects with these properties can figure in such a deduction. On the whole I think that one could formulate the definitions (ME) and (E) more clearly in the following way:
(ME!) A macro-property F of a complex system S with the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] is mechanically explainable if and only if the following is true:
(a) The statement "For all x: if x has the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] then x has the macro-property F" is a true law of nature, and (b) it is at least in principle possible to show, on the basis of the fundamental properties of S's components and the laws of nature generally applying to objects with these properties, that S (or the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R], itself) possesses all features which are characteristic of the property F.
(E!) A macro-property F of a complex system S with the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] is emergent if and only if the following is true:
(a) on the one hand the statement "For all x: if x has the microstructure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] then x has the macro-property F" is a true law of nature, but on the other hand These definitions are extremely interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they have the remarkable consequence that, according to Broad, mechanically explainable as well as emergent macro-properties supervene on the micro-structures of the systems of which they are properties. 6 Thus, according to Broad mechanically explainable macro-properties as well as emergent ones have a micro-structural basis. One cannot, therefore, elucidate the difference between mechanically explainable and emergent properties by means of the concept of supervenience. This is the case because the difference resides precisely in the fact thatalthough both types of properties supervene on the micro-structures of the systems in which they occur -mechanically explainable properties moreover can be deduced from these micro-structures while emergent properties cannot.
In addition to the problems already mentioned, one cannot formulate a version of physicalism on the basis of the concept of supervenience because this concept does not amount to a specific position, but covers a range of clearly different stances. 7 The claim that mental properties are emergent implies just as much that they supervene on physical properties as does the claim that mental properties are mechanically explainable or physically realized. In the last consequence this is even true for Semantic Physicalism and the Identity Theory -according to these positions, too, mental properties supervene on physical properties.
Thus, the fulfilment of the condition (PhB) is a necessary condition for all versions of property physicalism, but not more. 8 Or in other words: the concept of supervenience is an umbrella under which all physicalist positions can be found (and some other positions as well), but it is not a position in itself.
The second interesting aspect of Broad's definitions lies in the fact that the condition (b) of the definition (ME) contains convincing and very general concepts of identity and realization. For what else is it supposed to mean that F is realized by G than that the possession of G (always or at least in a certain system) leads to S's possession of all features which are characteristic of the property F, or that G itself (always or at least in a certain system) possesses all 6 To a certain extent Broad can therefore count as the inventor of the idea of mereological supervenience. 7
Cf. also Kim in his contribution to this volume. 8 Horgan (1993) also argues that supervenience on its own is not sufficient.
features characteristic of the property F? Therefore, it seems very plausible to define in Broad's sense the concept of realization as follows:
(R) A property F is realized within a system S through the property G if and only if S has the property G and if it follows on the basis of the laws of nature which generally apply to objects with the property G, that S if it has the property G, possesses all features which are characteristic of F, or that G in the system S possesses all features which are characteristic of F. 9
However, if this is a reasonable definition, theoretical identity seems to be nothing but a special case of realization, namely the case which obtains if, for whatever reasons, F is only realized by a single property G:
A property F is theoretically identical with the property G if and only if any object x has F if and only if it has G and if it follows on the basis of the laws of nature which generally apply to objects with the property G that objects which possess the property G possess all features which are characteristic of F, or that G itself possesses all features which are characteristic of F.
Summing up the considerations so far, we arrive at four, not three, possible relations in which mental properties or states can stand to physical properties or states.
(1) Semantical Physicalism All mental predicates are definable in physical language.
(2) Identity Theory Every mental property is identical with a physical property.
(3) Realization Theory Every mental property has a physical basis by which it is realized. 9 Obviously, one also has to consider the possibility that at different times F is realized within the very same system by different properties. Strictly speaking, the definition (R) should therefore be amended in the following way: (R!) A property F is realized within a system S at a time t through the property G if and only if at t S has the property G and if it follows on the basis of the laws of nature which generally apply to objects with the property G, that S, if it has the property G at t, possesses at t all features which are characteristic of F, or that G at the time t in the system S possesses all features which are characteristic of F.
(4) Emergentism Every mental property has a physical basis; but the former is neither identical with this basis nor realized by it.
In order not to neglect full blooded Dualism we should add the fifth possibility (5) Full Blooded Dualism Mental properties do not even have a physical basis.
Without any doubt the positions (1) and (2) are just as physicalist as position (5) is non-physicalist or dualist. However, what is the situation with regard to the positions (3) and (4)?
Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism as it has been developed by its proponents is nothing but a variety of emergentism. I am not entirely convinced. Kim himself cites Block as holding that the anti-reductionistic consensus is based on the claim that biconditional bridge laws are not available so that a fortiori mental properties do not have coextensions in physical properties. However, neither emergentism nor the realization theory commit themselves to the existence of biconditional bridge laws. This means that the realization theory could also lay claim to the title of non-reductive physicalism. Hence, regarding the positions (3) and (4) not only one, but two questions can be asked: (a) Are they reductionistic positions? (b) Are they physicalist positions?
With respect to emergentism the answer to the first question must of course be negative. Without any doubt it is non-reductionistic -but is it physicalist? In my view there are strong arguments to the contrary. Physicalism does not only hold that the realm of physics is basic in the sense that all other things are nomologically dependent on it, but it also endorses the claim that, in a sense, everything is physical, i.e., that the only entities there are, are physical things and physical properties. Physicalism therefore entails that in a non-pleonastic, robust sense 10 there are not any essentially non-physical properties. However, it is the very point of emergentism that in addition to the fundamental physical properties it admits further properties; properties which cannot be accounted for in terms of physical properties.
This becomes especially clear if one examines emergent macro-properties to whose characteristic features it also belongs that they have certain (physical) effects. Consider for example the property of being magnetic. Among the characteristic features of this property are the following: Magnetic objects attract iron filings in their proximity and they induce electrical current in coils which they pass through. What would it mean then, if magnetism was an emergent property? On the one hand this would mean that this property mereologically supervenes on certain micro-structures, on the other hand it would also mean that these micro-structures are not responsible for the characteristic behaviour of magnetic objects. If magnetism was an emergent property, this would mean that whenever a magnetic object attracts iron filings or induces current in a coil, the only property that was causally responsible for these effects was the property of being magnetic. In this case magnetism would have to be an independent and robust property, since certain effects that magnetic objects can have on its environment can only be accounted for in terms of this property and not be explained by the micro-structures which form the basis of this property. The property of being magnetic would in this case certainly make a difference in the world. 11
However, even if having certain (physical) effects does not belong to the characteristic features of an emergent property, one can argue in a similar fashion. For in this case there must also be at least one characteristic feature which cannot be accounted for in terms of the underlying micro-structures, so there exists something new which goes beyond the micro-structures. Hence, in this case, too, the emergent property must possess a reality independent of the physical bases. Obviously, the position of emergentism is not a physicalist position.
The contrary is true for the position (3), the realization theory which, in my opinion, must clearly be classified as physicalist. This becomes apparent even in view of the fact that identity theory really is just a variety of realization theory, a variety being true if (as it were, accidentally) a mental property is only realized by a single physical micro-structure. Just as it would be nonsense to assume that apart from the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of a gas there would be the additional property of the temperature of this gas, it would be nonsense -if the realization theory is right -to assume that apart from their physical realizations there were also mental properties in a robust sense. The assumption of the existence of such properties would simply be empty since everything that can be accounted for by these properties is already being taken care of by their realizations. If F is an independent and robust property, this means that F makes a contribution to the world, i.e., that it makes a difference in the world whether an object has, or fails to have, F. However, if F is realized through a micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R], what new contribution would there be for F to make? Let us assume, ex impossibile, an object a had the microstructure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] but did not possess the macro-property F. What would be the difference between this case and the case in which a possesses both the micro-structure [C 1 , ..., C n ; R] and the property F? Obviously, there would not be any difference. For, if a has the micro-structure[C 1 , ..., C n ; R], then, according to the premises, a has all features which are characteristic of F, and therefore everything in the world will just go as if a had F. 12 For all these reasons the realization theory certainly is physicalist; but does this mean that it therefore also has to be classified as reductionistic? In my view, the answer to this question depends on the way we understand the concept of reductionism. On the one hand, the realization theory is as reductive as any theory could be. After all, this theory claims that individuals possess whatever mental properties they happen to have in virtue of their physical properties, i.e., that each mental property is realized by some physical property. As we have seen, this implies that there are not any robust mental properties above, or in addition to, the physical properties of an individual.
On the other hand, the realization theory does not imply the existence of biconditional bridge laws that connect each mental property with a coextensional physical property. This, in turn, means that the realization theory does not imply that we can do without mental terms, i.e., it does not endorse the claim that all that can be meaningfully said about an individual can (or even must) be said in physical terms. On the contrary: if mental properties are multiply realized, then we use mental predicates in order to group together all things in which the same mental properties are realized and which for that reason, e.g., behave in the same way. Multiple realizability in a sense implies that there are laws which cannot be formulated in physical language, because such multiple realizability implies that there are things which behave in the same way although they do not have anything in common with regard to their physical structure. If realization theory is correct, this therefore would not mean that mental predicates would be superfluous, but only that we would have to give up the assumption that the objects to which a mental predicate applies have a robust property in common.
Hence, realization theory is reductive insofar as it implies that, in a robust sense, there are not any mental properties over and above the physical properties. However, it is also non-reductive insofar as it endorses the view that the mental vocabulary is nonetheless indispensable for the formulation of some behavioral regularities. I leave it to the reader to weigh the arguments with regard to the original question.
To summarize my first point: I entirely agree with Kim's view that emergentism is not a physicalist position since it is not compatible with the central tenets of physicalism. However, I am not convinced that emergentism is the position the proponents of non-reductive physicalism have in mind in their quest for a version of physicalism that is not committed to the assumption of biconditional bridge laws. And I am not convinced, on the other hand, that the realization theory which in Kim's and in my view certainly is a variety of physicalism is physicalistic because it is also a kind of reductionism.
Identity, Realization and Reduction
However, if one adopts the concepts of identity (I) and of realization (R), which I think Broad had in mind, the following question immediately arises: How can one show that it follows from the laws of nature which generally apply to objects which possess the property G, that all objects which possess the property G have all features characteristic of F, or that it follows from the laws of nature which generally apply to objects which possess the property G, that S, if it possesses the property G at a time t, has at t all features characteristic of F? In my view, the role which theory reductions play for identities or realizations of properties must be addressed in the context of this question.
First, a short reminder. 13 According to the traditional Nagelian view, 14 a theory T 1 is reducible to a theory T 2 if the laws of T 1 can be deduced from T 2 and a set of suitable bridge laws. However, since this view encounters considerable difficulties, several alternatives were developed in recent years. Personally, I prefer the view put forward by C.A. Hooker. 15 According to Hooker, it is not essential for the reducibility of T 1 to T 2 that the laws of T 1 themselves can be deduced from the laws of T 2 and a set of suitable bridge laws, but rather that one can deduce an image of T 1 from T 2 . Or, to add a little more detail: What is 13 Cf. Beckermann (1992b, sec. 3).
14 Nagel (1961, ch. 11).
15 Hooker (1981) , cf. also Churchland (1985) .
essential to reducibility according to Hooker is that for each basic predicate F i (x) of T 1 there exists an expression A i (x) couched in the terms of T 2 such that for each basic law L of T 1 one can deduce an image law L' from T 2 where L' is the law we arrive at if we substitute all basic predicates
Understood in this way, what has theory reduction to do with property identity or realization? Consider an example, temperature. In my view, Kim's remarks concerning this property point in the right direction. As has already been noted by many others, e.g., J. Levine, temperature is a property that is exhaustively characterized by its causal role. (It already is characterized in this way, so it is not necessary to construe it "relationally in terms of its causal/nomological role".) (*) Temperature is the property "we experience through the sensations of warmth and cold, which is responsible for the expansion and contraction of mercury thermometers, which causes some gases to rise and others to sink, etc. ..." (Levine 1983, p. 355 ).
The causal role of temperature, however, is expressed by the laws of classical thermodynamics and the appropriate correspondence rules in which the term "temperature" occurs. This, in turn fits all too well to the fact that in the 1950s and 1960s many philosophers of science held that the meaning of the term "temperature" is implicitly given by the laws in which it occurs. Everything considered, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the characteristic features of the property of temperature are expressed by the laws of classical thermodynamics and appropriate correspondence rules. If temperature was identical to the mean kinetic energy of molecules this could therefore be accomplished by deducing an image of classical thermodynamics from statistical mechanics, for to show that temperature is identical with the mean kinetic energy of molecules is to show that it follows from the general laws of nature that this mean kinetic energy has exactly that causal role which is characteristic of temperature. Causal roles, however, are expressed by corresponding laws. Deducing for each basic law L of classical thermodynamics an image law L' from statistical mechanics, therefore, amounts to showing that it follows from the general laws of nature that the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of gases has all features characteristic of temperature.
An analogous relation holds with regard to property realizations, except that in this case the essential step is to deduce for each basic law L of T 1 a system relative image from T 2 , i.e., to deduce for each basic law of T 1 (assuming that L is of the form "For all x: ... F i (x) ---") from T 2 either (i) the corresponding lawlike sentence "... A i (S) ---" or (if "S" stands for a certain kind of system) (ii) the law "For all x: if x is of kind S: ... A i (S) ---". 16 Nowadays we know that temperature is not identical with the mean kinetic energy of molecules although it seems reasonable to assume that in ideal gases it is realized in this way. This corresponds to the fact that from statistical mechanics we can deduce system relative images of the second kind (ii), e.g., the image of Boyle-Charles' Law "For all x: if x is an ideal gas, then the product of the average momenta transferred from the molecules of x to the walls of the container and the volume of x equals R times the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of x," where R is a certain constant. The theoretical impact of this is the same as above: By deducing the system relative image laws mentioned, we show that with regard to ideal gases the mean kinetic energy of the molecules has exactly the causal/nomological role that is characteristic of temperature. To put it in other words, the deduction of system relative image laws is the very means by which we show that it follows from the general laws of nature that in an ideal gas the mean kinetic energy of the molecules has all features characteristic of temperature. Generally, the canonical way of establishing identity or realization claims with regard to properties which are fully characterized by their causal role is theory reduction, i.e., the deduction of (system relative) image laws from a suitable theory.
However, Kim seems to believe that theory reduction, thus understood, is the only means available in this context, or even stronger, that the concepts of property identity and realization are by their very meaning bound up with the notion of theory reduction. 17 If one takes the definitions (R) and (I) as starting points, there does not seem to be any reason for subscribing to this thesis. What is true, however, is that with respect to properties that are not fully characterized by their causal role, at present, we lack any clear idea of how to establish corresponding identity or realization claims. That is to say, if F is such a 16 Cf. Beckermann (1990 , and also Kim (1992b) .
17 In my view this is the deeper reason for Kim's claim that "we must first construe [a property F] ... relationally in terms of its causal/nomic relations" in order to be able to show that it is identical with, or realized by, another property G. In this context, I would like to add a remark on functionalism. Most of its proponents seem to advance not only one, but two claims: (a) all mental properties (and states) are fully characterized by their causal role; and (b) all mental properties (and states) are realized by physical properties (or states). The considerations up to this point should not only have rendered the relation between these claims perfectly transparent, but also it should have become clear that (a) and (b) are systematically independent. For (a) does not entail (b) and, even stronger, the falsehood of (a) does not entail the falsehood of (b).
property, we do not even know what it would mean to show that it follows from the general laws of nature that another property G has all features which are characteristic of F.
This, I believe, is the main source of all problems regarding the naturalization of phenomenal consciousness that lay at the heart of many recent debates within the philosophy of mind. Again, Levine's arguments are very helpful. He locates the reason for the fact that the relation between the mean kinetic energy of the molecules of a gas and its temperature is "fully explanatory" while the relation between the firing of C-fibers and pain is not, in the fact that temperature is fully characterized by a certain causal role while the concept of pain is not exhausted by its causal role. The first relation is explanatory in the sense that our knowledge of chemistry and physics makes intelligible how it is that something like the motion of molecules could play the causal role we associate with heat. Furthermore, antecedent to our discovery of the essential nature of heat, its causal role, captured in statements like [(*)], exhausts our notion of it.
Once we understand how this causal role is carried out there is nothing more we need to understand. (Levine 1983, p. 357 -my italics) The concept of pain is also related to a certain causal role: Pain is caused by tissue injury, it makes us scream or say "ouch" and it has the effect that in future we avoid the situation which caused the pain, etc. Therefore, we acquire a considerable amount of information if we learn that, e.g., the firing of C-fibers is the bearer of this role. Still, the case differs from that of temperature since the concept of pain is not exhausted by its causal aspects.
However, there is more to our concept of pain than its causal role, there is its qualitative character, how it feels; and what is left unexplained by the discovery of C-fiber firing is why pain should feel the way it does! For there seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally "fit" the phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some other set of phenomenal properties. Unlike its functional role, the identification of the qualitative side of pain with C-fiber firing ... leaves the connection between it and what we identify it with completely mysterious. One might say, it makes the way pain feels into merely a brute fact. (ibid.) This means that there are two reasons why the relation between C-fiber firings and pain fails to be fully explanatory: (a) the concept of pain comprises not only a causal role, but also a certain way of how it feels to be in pain, and (b) we do not know how to show just by the means of physics, chemistry and biology that C-fiber firing should feel the way pain feels to the person in which it occurs. 18 This is just an example of a very general issue: the naturalization of phenomenal states poses the serious problems it does because their qualitative features are such that at present we do not have the slightest idea of how we could show that it follows from the general laws of nature that certain brain states have those features. 19 However, saying that at present we lack such an idea, is not to say that the project is impossible. Maybe next month an article will be published in Erkenntnis, which will tell us how to go about it; but we haven't been told so far. All we have got for the moment are attempts to bypass the problem. Consider for example Hardin's strategy. He tries to find as many structural features of color experiences as possible that can be matched to the structural features of the neural states on which these experiences rest. If one is confronted with the wealth of details, his arguments indeed look very impressive. However, a general counter argument can be mounted by replying along the following lines: Look, structural features do not exhaust our concepts of color experiences, either. There still remain features for which it is not possible to show that it follows from the general laws of nature that the brain states which underlie the color experiences have them.
However this may be, the central claim in the last section was that the concepts of property identity (I) and realization (R) as I attribute them to Broad, clarify the relation between property identity and realization on the one hand and theory reduction or the deducibility of (system relative) image laws on the other. The latter is the canonical means for showing that a property F is identical with, or realized by, another property G if F is fully characterized by its causal/nomological role. But that is it -there is not any closer relation, let alone a conceptual one, as Kim appears to believe. At least he seems to hold that there is no other way of establishing claims about property identity and realization than some kind of (general or local) theory reduction. Personally, I tend to doubt even this weaker claim, although I have to admit that at present we do not have any idea of what promising alternative ways for establishing such claims could look like.
